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On the Epistemic and Social Foundations of Mathematics as 
Tool and Instrument in Observatories, 1793–1846  
 
David Aubin* 
May 2015, revised February 2016 
 
 
The astronomer is dependent on his tools; the observatory is but the receptacle 
of his tools, his tool-chest so to speak (Harrington 1883–1884, 249).  
 
One night, in June 1782, the Astronomer Royal Nevil Maskelyne suddenly felt “much out of 
love with his instrument.”1 William Herschel had come to Greenwich to stargaze in his 
company and Maskelyne had welcomed him. But to realize that all telescopes in the Royal 
Observatory were so much inferior to Herschel’s new reflector was disheartening to the 
Astronomer Royal. Observatory scientists indeed loved their instruments. In their 
publications, they devoted hundreds of pages to the description of telescopes. They drew them 
in exquisite details. They lobbied for years to obtain the requisite funds to buy the most 
precise instruments, only to wait even longer for the most reputable makers finally to provide 
them. Then, they spent hours and hours chasing and charting their inevitable defects. They 
discussed at great lengths the operations required for their perfect calibration, attended to their 
proper care, and improved them constantly (see, e.g., Carl 1863, Bell 1922, King 1955, 
Chapman 1996). Much more rarely, however, did tools command their attention.  
Astronomers, as we know, also loved mathematics. “Every part of the operations of an 
observatory is mathematical,” wrote one of Maskelyne’s successors, George Biddell Airy 
(1801–1892), in a memo dated December 4, 1861.2 In the practice of observatory scientists, 
mathematical theories and methods often were as central as their instruments. As the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*Sorbonne Universités, UPMC Univ paris 6, UMR 7586, Institut de mathématiques de 
Jussieu-Paris Rive Gauche, CNRS, Univ Paris Diderot, Sorbonne Paris Cité, F-75252 Paris, 
FRANCE. david.aubin@upmc.fr. 
1 William to Caroline Herschel, June 5, 1782; in Lubbock (1933), 115. 
2 “Remarks on the neglect, by the Junior Assistants, of the course of education and scientific 
preparation recommended to them,” Airy Papers, Cambridge University Library, RGO 6/43, 
235. About this memo, see (Aubin 2009, 273 and 276–277). 
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Königsberg Observatory director Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel (1784–1846) famously 
commented, mathematical corrections themselves improved the precision of telescopes:  
Every instrument is made twice, once in the workshop of the artisan, in brass and steel, 
but then again by the astronomer on paper, by means of the list of necessary 
corrections, which he determines in his investigations.3  
In view of examining how scientists used mathematics as a tool, we therefore see that the 
specific cultural and epistemological spaces delineated by astronomical observatories provide 
a promising terrain for a careful study of attitudes with respect to mathematics, tools, and 
instruments, and to their interactions.  
Observatory scientists themselves compared mathematics to their most cherished 
instruments. Logarithms, for example, were seen as an “admirable artifice that, by shortening 
computations, extends astronomers’ lives [just as] the telescope ha[s] increased their sight” 
(Biot 1803, 26). The link between the telescope and the logarithm echoed Kepler’s striking 
frontispiece to the Rudolphine Tables (1627) where “in the upper part, inventions that were 
the most useful to Astronomy are represented: Galileo’s telescope, Napier’s logarithms, and 
Kepler’s ellipse” (Delambre 1821, 1:558; see figure 1). In astronomical context, the 
comparison between a mathematical device, the logarithm, and a physical instrument, the 
telescope, was explicit.  
Of course, one has to remember that the word “instrument” is ambiguous (Van Helden 
& Henkins 1994). In the Novum Organum, Francis Bacon described the way in which “Man, 
Nature[’]s Minister and Interpreter,” was able to act and understand through experience and 
reason. In its original seventeenth-century English translation, Bacon’s second aphorism read: 
Things are performed by instruments and helps, which the Understanding needs as 
much as the Hand. Now as Mechanick Instruments assist and govern the Hands 
motion, likewise the instruments of the Understanding prompt and advise it (Bacon 
1676, 1; quoted in Taub 2011, 691).  
In this sense, it is self-evident that telescopes, logarithms, and ellipses should be thought of as 
different types of instruments for the eye or for the mind.4 But, going beyond this simple 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  Bessel (1848), 432; quoted in Hammel (1984, 40); trans. Crowe (1994), 156: “Jedes 
Instrument wird auf diese Art zweimal gemacht, einmal in der Werkstatt des Künstlers von 
Messing und Stahl; zum zweitenmale aber von dem Astronomen aud seinem Papiere, durch 
die Register der nöthingen Verbesserungen, welche er durch seine Untersuchung erlangt.” 
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identification, how can we situate more precisely the astronomer’s mathematical practices 
with respect to their instrumental practices? In earlier publications, we have offered a 
synthetic discussion of “observatory techniques” over the long nineteenth century (Aubin, 
Bigg, and Sibum 2010, Aubin 2015). Characteristic of the observatory culture, such 
techniques involved instrumental technology and observation practices, the social 
organization of working practices, and cognitive tools such as mathematical theories and 
methods. Whether they originated or not in this culture, observatory techniques formed a 
coherent set of practices and technologies. A specific aspect of the observatory culture was 
the role played by numbers and their collection, manipulation, storage, and transformation. 
Mathematics, I argued elsewhere, was just another instrument in observatory scientists’ 
panoply (Aubin 2009, 282).  
The present chapter is intended as a contribution to the philosophical debate regarding 
the “unreasonable effectiveness,” or applicability of mathematics to the natural sciences 
(Wigner 1960, Steiner 1998, Bangu 2012). If we take seriously the idea that mathematics was 
conceived as a tool or as an instrument—and, as I try to show, I believe that we must—then 
we need to pay attention to a few things. First, as Steiner has argued, this conception of the 
applicability of mathematics will slide the problem away from concepts, laws, and language 
to practice.5 On what ground indeed could a telescope be applied to the understanding of 
astronomical phenomena? This had very little to do with the way the instrument expressed 
scientific truths, but everything to do with the way it was devised, built, maintained, studied, 
and used. Second, to make the comparison with mathematics effective and culturally 
meaningful, I believe it is essential to pay a closer attention to the variety of material tools and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In this article, I shall not refer to the “mathematical instruments” tradition, which obviously 
played a role in shaping the conception of instruments in the observatory culture. By the late 
18th century, astronomers were relying on highly skilled makers, such as Jesse Ramsey and 
Edward Troughton, fellows of the Royal Society whose names were, as we shall see, 
routinely attached to the high-precision instruments they produced (Bennett 2011; see also 
Chapman 1995).  
5 As expressed by Gottlob Frege in 1884, there is a simple solution to the applicability 
problem: “The laws of numbers, therefore, are not really applicable to external things; they 
are not laws of nature. They are, however, applicable to judgments holding good of things in 
the external world: they are laws of the laws of nature” (Frege 1980, quoted by Wilholt 2006, 
74). For another visions of mathematics as a language in this context, see Sarukkai (2005).  
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instruments one encounters in relevant scientific environments. Documenting the case of the 
Paris Observatory in 1793, I am led to distinguish, for the sake of my argument, between 
scientific instruments and mere tools, and among the latter between simple tools and high-
precision tools. Third, as I show, such distinctions necessarily involved social criteria 
regarding users and the conditions of their use of devices. There were therefore high stakes in 
terms of users’ status in designating their equipment as tools or instruments.  Fourth, these 
distinctions also applied to the way mathematics was used by various people as tool and as 
instrument. Like in the philosophy of mathematical practice (Mancosu 2008), this approach 
shifts the focus of our attention from mathematical foundations to a wider range of practices. 
Looking at the computers’ daily routine at Greenwich in 1839, I exemplify the various 
meanings mathematics as a tool can have there.  
Finally, pursuing this approach raises the questions: How far can the analogy between 
mathematics and tools or instruments go? Have the notions of care, improvements, 
maintenance, and fixes corresponding meanings as far as mathematical instruments are 
concerned? Did astronomers develop with regards to their mathematical instruments the same 
kind of personal attachment, intimate knowledge about the ins and outs, and attention to the 
life history of their most prized material instruments? To provide extensive answers to such 
interrogation would be enough for a whole research program. With the perspective I adopt 
here, there are a number of cases in the history of mathematics that might be revisited with 
profit. Astronomers tinkered over and over again with the mathematical instruments that were 
handed down to them in order to increase their precision.6 In the last part of this paper, I will 
illustrate the fruitfulness of this approach by considering the case of Bessel functions.  
 
1. Tools vs. Instruments in the Paris Observatory, 1793  
To try and make sense of the distinction between tools and instruments in the context of the 
observatory, one may look at inventories. Take the case of the “inventory of instruments of 
the National Observatory in Paris” from 1793. 7 This report was drafted in rather dramatic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 One may think, among other cases, of the Gauss-Laplace theory of errors (Sheynin 1973) or 
Poincaré’s qualitative dynamics (Roque 2015).  
7 See “Pièce justificative N° X: Inventaire des instrumens de l’Observatoire national de Paris 
en 1793,” Archives nationales F17/1219; Archives de l’Observatoire D.5.38; repr.  (Cassini 
1810, 208–217). The date of this report is uncertain, but September 19, 1793 is a reasonable 
estimate (Wolf 1902, 349). Dated “19 of the first month of Year II” [which should be 19 
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circumstances. Following the abolition of the Academy of Sciences by the Republican 
Government, the traditional organization of the Paris Observatory under the Cassini dynasty 
was overturned. A decree stated that the Observatory was to be “republicanized” and that the 
former director Jean-Dominique Cassini, also known as Cassini IV, would loose all 
prerogatives over his former assistants. As a result Cassini resigned from his position and, on 
September 19, 1793, a delegation was sent to the Paris Observatory in order to draw a list of 
all its instruments. 
With respect to the distinction between instruments and tools [outils], this inventory is 
highly revealing, in part because it was written, not by astronomers, but by the delegates 
appointed by the Revolutionary Commission temporaire des arts, set up by Government 
following the suppression of the Academy of Science in August 1793.8 These delegates were 
the physicist Jacques Charles (1746–1823), and the instrument makers Étienne Lenoir (1744–
1832) and Jean Fortin (1750–1831) who unlike scientists were not highly experienced as 
writers. Fully conscious of what was at stake, Cassini however oversaw the inventory with 
keen eyes, as well as Jean Perny de Villeneuve (1765–?), Cassini’s former assistant and now 
temporary director of the Observatory, and the young Alexis Bouvard (1767–1843), who 
would stay at the observatory for the next fifty years.9  
The inventory of instruments drafted by the commissioners was divided in several 
sections: clocks (17 items), refracting telescopes (13), achromatic objectives (4), simple 
objectives (26), reflectors (5), micrometers (13), generic instruments (26), and—
interestingly—“tools and bits of machines” [outils et débris de machines] (24). As we can see, 
“tools” were listed here as special kinds of “instruments,” but perhaps not as highly valued as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
vendémaire, that is, October 10], the report was said to be completed when discussed by the 
Commission temporaire des arts on September 26. According to his biographer, Cassini left 
the Observatory never to come back, on October 3rd (S.-Devic 1851, 205).  
8 Informations about the Commission and these commissioners in particular can be found in 
its proceedings (Tuetet 1912). On scientific instruments at this time, see also Daumas (1953). 
On Charles, see (Blondel 2003).  
9 Under the Terror, Cassini was jailed in the English Benedictine Convent on February 14, 
1794. He was freed after Robespierre’s downfall, on August 5, 1794, but never returned to the 
Observatory. For more information on the history of the Paris Observatory during the French 
Revolution, I refer to Chapin (1990) and Aubin (2013); more complete accounts in French 
can be found in Cassini (1810), S.-Devic (1851), and Wolf (1902).   
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the others, as can be inferred from their showing up pell-mell with other bits and pieces at the 
end of the inventory.10 Astronomers’ knowledge about their instruments was rather intimate: 
their dimensions, origins, flaws, and present states were all precisely established. The most 
valuable ones had proper names attached to them and in fact often were the combination of 
several instruments. The first refracting telescope was described as such: 
N° 1. Achromatic telescope by Dollond, objective with three glass [pieces] of 42 lines 
of aperture, 3 feet and half of focal length; it has three oculars, one terrestrial and two 
celestial ones; it is mounted on a mahogany stand with cupper columns with all its 
motions; to this telescope an heliometer by Bouger can be fitted, simple objective, plus 
a wire micrometer by Hautpois.11  
Let us emphasize the individuality of such instruments. Cassini for example remembered 
having used Dollond’s refractor to observe the phases of Saturn in 1774 (Cassini 1793, 153). 
Also known as the lunette du prince de Conti because the Prince had bought it after the Duke 
of Chaulnes’s death in 1769, the Dollond refractor was rented to Cassini III on several 
occasions and sold to the Observatory in 1778 (Wolf 1902, 242–243; Barty-King 1986, 92). 
Found to have serious defects, it was neglected at the time of the inventory.  
“Tools” in contrast were more generic, even when they were better built. In fact, the 
tools mentioned in the inventory were not simple tools like hammers or screwdrivers, but 
rather high-precision special-purpose tools, like three long steel rulers, which had been 
“worked for an infinite [amount of] time and with infinite care to obtain a straight line,” and 
drawing marble tables “polished in mirror-like manner” (Cassini 1810, 215–216). These tools, 
Cassini explained in a footnote added later, had been acquired to equip the workshop set up in 
1784 at the Observatory in an ill-fated attempt at fostering the development of high-precision 
instrument making in Paris (Wolf 1902, 277–286; Daumas 1953, 358–360). Only the most 
notable tools therefore were deemed worthy of mention in the inventory, as they already were 
in Cassini’s detailed account books, which specified the price that had been paid for the steel 
rulers and the marble tables (respectively, 480 and 368 livres [Wolf 1902, 279–280]). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 About instruments in state of disrepair, see Schaffer (2011).  
11 Cassini 1810, 209: “N° 1. Lunette achromatique de Dollond, objectif à trois verres de 42 
lignes d’ouverture, 3 pieds et demi de foyer; elle a trois oculaires, un terrestre et deux 
célestes; elle est montée sur un pied d’acajou à colonne de cuivre avec tous ses mouvemens; à 
cette lunette s’adapte un héliomètre de Bouger, objectif simple, plus un micromètre filaire de 
Hautpois.”  
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Although much higher, the cost of furnishing and equipping the workshop with common tools 
were significantly given in bulk in Cassini’s accounts.  
While there was no entry for the word instrument in Diderot and D’Alembert’s 
Encyclopédie a generic definition was given to outil by Louis de Jaucourt, one of the most 
prolific contributors to the encyclopedia. He provided a similar distinction between tools and 
instruments:  
TOOL, (...) an instrument used by workmen and artisans to work on the different tasks 
of their professions, crafts, and trades; thus are hammers, compasses, planes, squares, 
braces, etc. […] Let us simply add that workmen distinguish somewhat between tools 
and instruments, and that not all instruments are tools.12   
Jaucourt’s definition echoed the inventory made by Charles, Fortin, and Lenoir who agreed 
that tools were a specific genre of instruments, albeit less noble, not all instruments being 
tools. In a book by Louis Cotte (1740–1815), one finds more complex and more interesting 
webs of meaning around those terms.13 Intent of showing in his Vocabulaire portatif des 
mécaniques that the beauty of God’s work was no less present in the products of human art 
and industry than in Nature, Cotte explained the differences among the terms machine, 
instrument, apparatus, and tool:  
We understand by machine a combination of several simple machines, such as the 
lever, the winch, the pulley, etc. whose action is to stand in for man’s strength and to 
produce great effects in little time and at little expanse in all mechanical operations in 
which they are employed. […] The instrument is a kind of machine, but [one] 
susceptible of great precision, to be employed in scientific operations which require 
accuracy, like astronomy, practical geometry, surgery, etc. The apparatus is a 
combination of different instruments whose combination contributes to the 
demonstration of physical, mathematical, and chemical truths. The tool is a simple 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Diderot and D’Alembert, 11: 718, original emphasis: “OUTIL, (…) instrument dont les 
ouvriers & artisans se servent pour travailler aux différens ouvrages de leur profession, art & 
métier; tels sont les marteaux, les compas, les rabots, les équerres, les villebrequins, &c. […] 
Nous ajoutons seulement que les ouvriers mettent quelque différence entre les outils & les 
instrumens; tout outil étant instrument, & tout instrument n'étant point outil.” 
13 Father Cotte, a cleric, is known for his work on meteorology and on the popularization of 
natural history, physics, and astronomy. See Pueyo (1994).  
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instrument, often of the sort of the wedge, which is useful in the manual and common 
operations of the crafts and trades.14  
In Cotte’s view, tools were simple instruments, which themselves were a special sort of 
machines. The distinctions he established were based on two criteria: dichotomy between 
simplicity and precision, on the one hand, and the kinds of operations they were employed in, 
on the other. Instruments were characterized by precision and their use in operations geared at 
discovering new truths about nature, whereas tools were necessary simple and to be used by 
craftsmen in their daily and mundane occupations.15  
Going back to the Paris Observatory inventory, we see that Cotte’s criteria apply well, 
but not completely. In the inventory, the only explicit distinction was social. “Instruments” 
were high-precision objects used by savants in their scientific operations in order to uncover 
scientific truths, whereas “tools” were to be used by craftsmen and makers in the workshop. 
But there was nothing common or mundane about the tools listed, and their precision seemed 
highly valued. At the Paris Observatory, tools were specialized instruments acquired to help 
artisans make the optical instruments required by astronomers. Instruments surely lay both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Cotte 1801, viii–ix, original emphasis: “On entend par Machine une combinaison de 
plusieurs machines simples, telles que le levier, le treuil, la poulie, etc. dont le résultat est de 
suppléer aux forces de l’homme et de produire de grands effets en peu de tems et avec peu de 
dépense dans toutes les Opérations mécaniques où elles sont employees […]. L’Instrument 
est bien aussi une espèce de machine, mais susceptible d’un très-grande precision, pour 
pouvoir être employee dans les Opérations scientifiques qui demandent de l’exactitude, 
comme l’astronomie, la géométrie pratique, la chirurgie, etc. L’Appareil est une combinaison 
de différens instrumens dont la reunion concourt à démontrer les vérités physiques, 
mathématiques, chimiques, etc. L’Outil est un instrument simple, le plus souvent de l’espèce 
du coin, qui sert dans les Opérations manuelles et habituelles des arts et des métiers.” 
15 It is interesting to note that, in the definition of the word instrument, the Oxford English 
Dictionary today explains, similarly, that the distinction between tools, instruments, and 
machines, is based on social, rather than lexicographical, grounds:  “Now usually 
distinguished from a tool, as being used for more delicate work or for artistic or scientific 
purposes; a workman or artisan has his tools, a draughtsman, surgeon, dentist, astronomical 
observer, his instruments. Distinguished from a machine, as being simpler, having less 
mechanism, and doing less work of itself; but the terms overlap.” Note added to the definition 
of “Instrument” (www.oed.com). 
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literally and figuratively at the center of the observatory, but the place of tools was ambiguous 
in this cultural space. While simple tools went unmentioned, some of the high-precision tools 
found their place in the list side by side with instruments. Like instruments, such tools 
possessed their own history and individuality, but they were to be used by different people.  
There is a final twist we need to take into account. In a culture that praised inventiveness, 
to design one’s own tools might however be good ground for claiming some degree of 
recognition from the astronomers’ part. At the end of the seventeenth century, Abraham 
Sharp, John Flamsteed’s assistant at Greenwich, thus was highly praised for his skill as an 
observer and as a mathematician, but also for talent as a mechanic, having “made himself 
most of the tools used by joiners, clock-makers, opticians, mathematical-instrument-makers, 
&c.” (Anonymous 1781, 462). When the Dudley Observatory was built in Albany, New York, 
in 1856, the overseeing board duly noted the director Benjamin Apthorp Gould’s technical 
ingenuity with his tools: 
Great difficulties were encountered in boring or drilling the horizontal holes through 
the stone piers of the meridian circle, a difficulty attributed by Dr. Gould in great 
measure to the inefficiency of the tools. He changed the whole character of the drills, 
using cast iron instead of steel; and with much simpler appliances has accomplished 
the work successfully (Henry, Bache, and Pierce 1858, 23).16 
The use of tools was reserved to people with a lower status in the observatory, but inventively 
tinkering with them could help assistants and astronomers alike gain recognition. 
 
2. The Eight-Hour Day: Mathematics as a Tool at Greenwich, 1839 
In this context, whether observatory mathematics could be seen as a simple tool, a high-
precision tool, or an instrument crucially hinged on the way it was put to use: Who would use 
it? How? And to what purpose? To examine this issue, let us focus on the Royal Observatory 
Greenwich under Airy’s directorship. In the memo quoted above, Airy explicitly spelt out his 
view of the place of mathematics in an observatory.  
The action and faults of telescopes and microscopes require for their understanding a 
knowledge of Mathematical Optics. Every discussion and interpretation of the 
observations requires Mathematical Astronomy. The higher problems, such as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 On the history of this observatory, see Wise (2004).  
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discovery of the elements of a comet’s orbit from observations, require the high 
Mathematics of Gravitational Astronomy.17  
In short, mathematics was everywhere. Moreover, in Airy’s understanding, formal hierarchies 
among personnel hinged on their level of mathematical knowledge much more than anything 
else.18 At the bottom of the scale, were supernumerary computers. In addition to being able to 
“write a good hand and good figures” and “to write well from dictation, to spell correctly and 
to punctuate fairly”, computers were to have rudimentary mathematical knowledge, 
essentially restricted to arithmetic, including vulgar and decimal fractions, extraction of 
square roots, use of logarithms, and the use of ±. Next came the Assistant, first, second and 
third grades, whose competencies were mostly evaluated through their knowledge of 
mathematics, from simple Euclidean geometry to analytical mechanics “especially in 
reference to Gravitational Astronomy.”  
In Airy’s observatory, computers were the mathematical artisans of the observatory, 
and, as such, I would like to say that they used mathematics as a tool, and not as an 
instrument. They used mathematics like apprentices in optical workshops handled the basic 
unspoken tools such as drills and bores, and not like astronomers manipulated telescopes in 
observatories. To illustrate this point, let us focus on a significant episode of the labor history 
of computing: the way in which Greenwich computers earned the eight-hour day.19  
It all started on Monday afternoon, January 21, 1839. Computers were chitchatting in 
the Royal Observatory’s Octagon Room. Rain had fallen nearly all day and the Astronomer 
Royal had left for London.20 One of them started to complain about their working conditions. 
His was a new face in the room: some H. W. Bowman who had just been hired. His age is 
unknown, but like most of the other computers there, he must have been very young, twenty 
years old at the most. Less than two weeks earlier, Airy had described what Bowman’s new 
job would be about: “The work is almost entirely of calculation, and it is highly important that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 “Remarks on the neglect, by the Junior Assistants, of the course of education and scientific 
preparation recommended to them” (Dec. 4, 1861). RGO 6/43, 235.  
18 Several slightly different copies of this memo are extent in Airy’s papers in Cambridge 
University Library. A first draft was written on November 20, 1856 and a slightly revised 
version was adopted on May 10, 1857. In the following I quote from RGO 6/43, 170–175. For 
a more detailed analysis of this memo, see (Aubin 2009, 277).  
19 For a study of the division of computing labor at Greenwich, see Grier (2005).  
20 RGO 6/24/33: Airy’s Diary.  
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the computer should understand the use of the + and − signs in the various operations of 
additions, subtraction, multiplication and division.”21 Before a formal offer could be made to 
Bowman, it was agreed that the head of the computing bureau, J. W. Thomas, would check 
the value of his work. Now, Bowman seemed unhappy with the job. If he were to work so 
many hours, he lamented to his colleagues, he could not possibly live long. Typically, 
computers at Greenwich worked from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m.; they had a one-hour break for dinner, 
while Saturday afternoons and Sundays were free. Therefore, Bowman went on, “time must 
have some weight in making [him] an offer.”22  
Brought in the observatory as a computer, Bowman seems to have had few skills 
worth bragging about. At first he had trouble with additions and subtractions: “He knew 
nothing of either,” his superior Thomas reported. “The − he called a stroke and the + he called 
a cross and he considered the sign × equally the same.” Asked to find the logarithm of the 
sine of 42°19’ in Jean-François Callet’s Tables portatives (published in 1783 on the basis of 
William Gardiner’s), Bowman did not know where to begin. But despite foreboding 
beginnings, two weeks later Thomas was forced to aver that Bowman “has come pretty 
middling—he can add – × and ÷ very well providing the numbers be of one denomination.” 
All in all, depending on whether he was willing to study or not, the new recruit could “be 
valued equal Mr Richard Dunkin.”23  
This comparison spoke highly in favor of Bowman. Richard Dunkin was the son of 
William Dunkin, himself a computer of considerable experience who had worked for the 
Nautical Almanac for more than twenty years. Hired at twenty-three, he was allowed to stay 
in Truro, Cornwall, working in his home. In 1832 when the Nautical Almanac Office was 
established in London by its new superintendent Lieutenant William Samuel Stratford, to his 
regret Dunkin Sr. was forced to leave with his family his “semi-independent position at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Airy to Bowman (January 8, 1839). RGO 6/526, 86.  
22 Thomas to Airy (21 January 1839). RGO 6/525, 29, orig. emphasis; Dunkin (1999), 72.  
23 All quotations in the above paragraph from Thomas to Airy (21 January 1839). RGO 6/524 
File 10bis, 352, orig. emphasis. “Units of the same kind but of different magnitudes, as 
pounds, shillings, pence, and farthings, which are units of value (…) are called units of 
different denominations” (De Morgan 1831, 25). 
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Truro,” and accept a “daily sedentary confinement to an office-desk for a stated number of 
hours in the company of colleagues all junior to himself in age and habits.”24 
William Dunkin never ceased to regret his previous life. Like many in his cohort who 
reluctantly saw the industrial age forced upon them, Dunkin wished his sons to do better. 
Having worked as a miner in his youth, he remembered that: “the underground tributer’s work 
was occasionally far more lucrative than the scientific work to which his after-life was 
devoted” (Dunkin 1999, 42–43). He thus took great care of his sons’ education which he 
expected would help them get a foothold in business: “His great desire was that they should 
be educated for a mercantile life, and that they should not become computers. As a computer 
all his life from youth, he always, and perhaps truly, considered that it was not a profession 
that gave much prospect of advancement in social position” (Dunkin 1999, 46). In Camden 
Town, where the Dunkins had their house, the boys were schooled at Wellington House 
(where Charles Dickens had been a pupil in 1824–27). Later, at least two of them were sent a 
French boarding school, near Calais. 
But sorrows repeatedly stroke the Dunkins. William’s first son died in March 1832. 
Three years later, an abscess formed on one of his feet and would not go away. The walk to 
the Nautical Almanac Office got harder and harder until William was allowed to compute at 
home again. Meanwhile, in less than five weeks in the spring of 1836 two more of Dunkin’s 
children, a boy and a girl, had died. On July 3, 1838, William Dunkin also passed away, 
leaving his wife alone with two boys: Richard aged 15 and Edwin two years his elder. 
Lieutenant Stratford knew the Dunkin family was in duress when he recommended the boys 
to Airy. Richard and Edwin were recalled from their boarding school in Calais (Dunkin 1896, 
197), and in August of that year, both joined Airy’s team of computers, where the boys 
quickly proved to be excellent.  
On January 21, 1839, after having reported Bowman’s complaints to his boss, Thomas 
nonetheless warned Airy that if working conditions remained too harsh, the Dunkins might 
lend receptive ears to offers they might receive from elsewhere—“and to lose these two 
would be a great loss.”25 Bowman indeed was not alone to whine about the practical aspects 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Dunkin (1999), 45. Stratford (1791–1853) entered the Navy on 10 February 1806; he was 
the first secretary of the Royal Astronomical Society in 1826–31 and superintendent of the 
Nautical Almanac from 1830 to his death. On the story of this institution up to that point, see 
Dunkin (1898) and Croarken (2003). 
25 All quotes are from Thomas to Airy (January 21, 1839). RGO 6/525, 29. 
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of his new job. Earlier, a young computer named Thaddeus Foley also had had his conflict 
with Thomas: he “condemns the place. He styles it a beastly place, a slavery, and that no one 
but a half starved beggar would stop in it.”26 Consulted on the matter, Lieutenant Stratford 
could not hide his surprise at Airy’s readiness to “binding persons” for so long every day.27 
How could the Astronomer Royal expect work to be done well in such conditions? “As to 
myself,” Thomas the overseer went on, “I complain not,” but like Stratford he supported his 
computers’ complaints, if only for fear of injuring the work.  
Being constant at work a person becomes stupefied and although still working at the 
same rate now begins to commit blunders and the examiner will with the same state of 
mind run over them and mark them as correct—such has been the case and such will 
be the case. And I am confident that to continue to work 11 hours a day much longer 
will not answer the purpose.28 
In the culture of the nineteenth observatory, precision was everything (Wise 1995). 
The paradox of the computer’s work therefore was posed as such: how could one rest assured 
that a low-skilled employee with a small pay would be carrying out a tedious and repetitive 
task for several long hours every day without making any error; and when errors inevitably 
occurred, how could they be promptly detected? In the event, the Astronomer Royal was 
sensitive to Thomas’s argument. He agreed to reduce working hours from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. 
with an hour break, or from 8 p.m. to 4 p.m. if the computers were to take no break at all. 
Everyone agreed they preferred to finish at the earliest time possible. The Greenwich 
computers had earned the eight-hour day.  
Social progress notwithstanding, this episode—perhaps more than the case of the 
personal equation to which we shall come back—illustrates the way in which Airy’s 
observatory was transformed into a factory with a strict discipline (Schaffer 1988). The 
mathematics mobilized by computers consisted of simple tools indeed and their work was 
mostly manual. Mathematics was for sure used as a tool at Greenwich: it was a tool, and 
perhaps a machine-tool, used by computers to perform a task assigned to them under the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Thomas to Airy (undated [1838]). RGO 6/525, 15, orig. emphasis. Esq. Mathematical 
Master at the Royal Naval School, Camberwell, Foley was later elected a Fellow of the Royal 
Astronomical Society; see Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 6 (1844), 52. 
27 Stratford’s opinions about computers are in Thomas to Airy (21 January 1839). RGO 6/525 
File 1, 29. 
28 Thomas to Airy (January 21, 1839). RGO 6/525 File 1, 29. 
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constant supervision of their boss, it was a tool used by assistant to climb up the hierarchy, it 
was a tool used by the observatory director to assert his authority over his staff and the 
general public. But, as a simple tool, it hardly deserved special attention. These aspects of the 
use of mathematics in the observatory leaving few public records are therefore rather hard to 
study historically. There are however instances when mathematics ceased to be a simple tool 
and became one of the most powerful instruments at observatory scientists’ disposal.  
 
3. Improving Instruments with Mathematics and Mathematics as an Instrument in 
Königsberg, 1815–1824 
In the observatory context, using mathematics as an instrument is a whole other matter than 
using as a simple tool. Like all other instruments—or, rather, in combination with them—
mathematics used as an instrument was put to the service of increasing precision. At the end 
of his life, Bessel was already terminally ill when on October 5, 1854 he wrote a touching 
letter to Airy.29 Referring to the publication over which Airy’s computers had toiled for years, 
Bessel expressed his great pleasure “in the evening of my scientific life to see a work 
completed on whose advancement I have bestowed a great part of the morning and noon of 
that life.” 30 He praised the Astronomer Royal for having “brought through to an end the great 
and still extending labour” and recalled how at the beginning of his career he had set on the 
similar task that would be Airy’s main inspiration:  
When, forty years ago, I entered upon my astronomical course, and found myself in 
the full possession of the bodily strength and activity which are indispensable to 
render a life useful to science, I found myself naturally obliged to consider carefully 
the state of astronomy, and to exert myself to make out clearly what must be done in 
order to establish it more firmly than it appeared to be established: in order to give it a 
form which should not withdraw itself from the ever-advancing improvement 
(founded on the very nature of science) in our knowledge of the heavenly movements, 
but should rather enable us to increase progressively the correctness of the earlier 
determination by the use of the later observations, so that they might asymptotically 
draw near to the truth which never can be reached (ibid.). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 On Bessel, see Hammel (1984) and Ławrynowicz (1995), as well as Olesko (1991).  
30 Bessel to Airy (October 5, 1845). RGO 6/530, 75–76. I quote from one of the two (nearly 
identical) English translations in Airy’s papers (ibid., 76–78 and 79–80).  
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To improve the correctness of observations made earlier led Bessel to study carefully 
every source of errors he could think of. Errors of astronomical observation, he wrote, formed 
two classes: those that “are dependent on innumerable accidental causes and therefore can be 
considered to follow the general propositions of the calculus of probability” and those “that 
are provoked by constantly acting causes and which are to be ascribed to the deviation of the 
instruments from their mathematical ideal or from their manner of treatment.”31 Skirting 
around the issue of the personal equation, Bessel had first believed that the second class of 
errors could be diminished “through the insight of the observer and rigour in the investigation 
of the instrument and in the method of observation” (ibid., orig. emphasis). By carefully 
tracking down Bessel’s role in the well-visited history of the personal equation, Christoph 
Hoffmann (2007) has reminded us that in this case the observer was not considered as a 
human laborer in need of discipline, but rather as a source of errors among others.32  
For our purpose, Bessel’s final treatment of the personal equation  rather points toward 
the conclusion that mathematics served in the hand of the skilled astronomer as a high-
precision tool that would improve the accuracy of observation, whether by investigating the 
instrument, the physical conditions in which it was used, or even physiological differences 
between observers. Bessel’s Tabulae Regiomontanae (in 1830) were a masterwork of error 
analysis based on Greenwich observations of fundamental stars (including Maskelyne’s) and 
gave the mean and apparent motions of 38 stars from 1750 to 1850. About these tables, John 
Herschel (son of William’s) wrote: “It affords the first example of the complete and thorough 
reduction of great series of observations, grounded, in the first instance, on a rigorous 
investigation, from the observations themselves, of all the instrumental errors, and carried out 
on a uniform plan, neglecting no minutiæ which a refined analysis and a perfect system of 
computation could afford” (Herschel 1847, 203–204). Herschel also quoted the Danish 
astronomer Heinrich Christian Schumacher (1780–1850) according to whom: “One may 
almost assert that one exact and able calculator is capable of doing better service to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Bessel (1820), 19; trans. Hoffmann (2007), 346, my emphasis: “die eine enthält die 
eigentlichen Beobachtungsfehler, die von unzähligen zufälligen Ursachen abhängen und 
deshalb den allgemeinen Sätzen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung folgend angesehen werden 
können; die andere begreift die von beständig einwirkenden Ursachen herrührenden, der 
Abweichung der Instrumente von ihrer mathematischen Idee, oder ihrer Behandlungsart 
zuzuschreibenden.” 
32 On the personal equation, see also Schaffer (1988) and Canales (2001).  
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astronomical science than two new observatories” (ibid., 203). In this sense, mathematics 
truly replaced optical instruments. 	  
In Bessel’s practice, mathematics was thoroughly used as a specialized tool, like the 
expensive rulers and marble tables found at the Paris Observatory, and his innovative use of 
such tool drew attention to his work. In a letter to Airy about his method (November 9, 1833), 
Bessel commented that: “[i]t would be useless, to enter here into the particularities of the 
computations” (Bessel 1875–1876, 3:462). There was no need to discuss such simple tools as 
mere computation. To improve the precision of the observations by means of the 
mathematical treatment of raw data, Bessel however emphasized some high-precision tool 
coming from practical astronomy, in particular the computation of elements, that is, the main 
constants (aberration, nutation, refraction) to take into account in the reduction of 
astronomical data. “Every new inquiry, increasing the weight of the result, issueing [sic] from 
the combination of this and former inquiries, the remaining error, probably will diminish 
continually; but this error, never vanishing entirely, it will (generally speaking) be necessary, 
to exhibit the result of a computation, depending upon some assumed values of certain 
Elements in a form open to further corrections” (Bessel 1875–1876, 3: 463). In other words, 
as a high-precision tool, mathematics could be used to reduce the errors, but remained 
dependent on a set of theoretical and observational assumptions.  
Bessel went further and also explored various uses of mathematics that take us even 
closer to the idea of an instrument. When he set up his observatory in Königsberg, Bessel 
received a Dollond telescope of 4 feet of focal length and 2.7 inches of aperture (Bessel 1815, 
iii; Bessel 1875–1876, 19). As he wrote to Carl Friedrich Gauss on 30 December 1813, this 
was “one of the best instruments in existence,” believing he would be able to observe with it 
angles with a precision of 1” to 2” (Gauss and Bessel 1975 [1880], 181). However, it was not 
perfect. In his letter to Gauss, Bessel tellingly described in the same breath a modest shade he 
had devised to protect his telescope from sun warmth and new methods in mathematical 
analysis he had come up with to improve the precision of his instrument by analyzing its 
small defects. Having undertaken the microscopic investigation of the small ellipticity and 
eccentricity of the pivot, Bessel explained that he used what he called an application of 
Gauss’s least-square method, which he had come upon on another occasion and which he felt 
was “very elegant.” In his later publication, Bessel explained: “Before giving the detailed 
investigation of this and other errors of the circle, I allow myself a digression about the 
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solution of a class of equations frequently occurring in practical astronomy, which will find 
their application here.”33  
In my view, Bessel’s “digression” represents the moment when he ceased to view 
mathematics as a tool, even a high-precision one mobilized to improve his Dollond refractor, 
and started to consider mathematics itself as an instrument. Mathematics as an instrument 
should also be submitted to the same inquiry as physical instruments and observers. In doing 
so, mathematics itself would be perfected not for its own sake, but for the sake of improving 
the precision of astronomical observations. Let us briefly say what Bessel’s digression was 
about. It concerns Bessel’s own approach at determining the coefficient of a finite 
trigonometric series representing a function, developed independently from Joseph Fourier’s 
(Dutka 1995, 127). On July 2, 1818, Bessel read a paper at the Berlin Academy of Sciences 
where he extended his earlier digression to infinite trigonometric series, therefore providing a 
first formal treatment of what came to be called Fourier series. When a function of 𝑈 is 
expanded in the series  (Bessel 1819; repr. Bessel 1875–1876, 1:18):  𝑈 = 𝐴! sin𝑢 + 𝐴!! sin 2𝑢 +⋯+   𝐴 ! sin 𝑖𝑢 +⋯   +   𝐵′ cos𝑢+ 𝐵!! cos 2𝑢+⋯+   𝐵 ! cos 𝑖𝑢 +⋯   
then, in general, the coefficients could be expressed as  𝐴(!) = 1𝜋 𝑈 sin 𝑖𝑢 ∙ 𝑑𝑢𝐵(!) = 1𝜋 𝑈 cos 𝑖𝑢 ∙ 𝑑𝑢      from  𝑢 = 0to  𝑢 = 2𝜋 . 
Pointing out that this type of series expansion was useful in a variety of astronomical 
questions, he went on to describe the way these developments could be used to give an 
analytic solution of what he called the “Keplerian problem,” that is, the computation of the 
true variation (or anomaly) of an elliptic orbit perturbed by another body. Bessel explained 
that the difference between the true and mean anomalies could be expressed as a 
trigonometric series of the mean anomaly, whose coefficient would be expressed as a power 
series of the eccentricity.    
Pursuing his studies on that problem, Bessel presented a paper titled “Study of the Part 
of Planetary Perturbations Arising from the Motion of the Sun” at the Berlin Academy of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Bessel (1819), ix; (1875–1876), 2: 24: “Ehe ich die nähere Untersuchung dieses und der 
übrigen Fehler des Kreises mittheile, erlaube ich mir eine Abschweifung über die Auflösung 
einer häufig in der praktischen Astronomie vorkommenden Classe von Gleichungen, die ihre 
Anwendung finden wird.”  
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Science on January 29, 1824. In this remarkable communication, he considered that when the 
motion of a planet around the sun was perturbed by another planet, this perturbation had two 
parts: the direct action of the perturbing planet and the indirect action of the sun whose 
trajectory was also perturbed. To tackle this problem, Bessel followed Laplace’s method and 
expressed the problem in polar coordinates. Extending his earlier approach to this case, he 
found that results could be given as a function of two integrals he noted 𝐼!! and 𝐽!!. Exploring 
further mathematical properties of these integrals, he established several of their mathematical 
properties, for example the recursive property: 𝑘𝐼!!!! − 2ℎ𝐼!! + 𝑘𝐼!!!! = 0. 
Typically, for an observatory scientist, Bessel also provided several pages of tables giving 
numerical values of the functions 𝐼!! and 𝐼!! for different values of 𝑘.   
These expressions came to be called Bessel functions. Of the mathematical tools 
developed by astronomers in the early nineteenth century, they certainly are among the most 
prominent (see, e.g., Watson 1966; Hochstadt 1986, ch. 8). But if Bessel functions are a high-
precision tool for mathematical physicists and engineers, I want to argue that, in the 
observatory culture, they had more similarities with instruments than with tools. Indeed, 
Bessel did not develop this analysis by tinkering with existing mathematics in order to 
improve the efficiency of an existing instrument but rather invented new mathematical 
theories to test Newton’s theory of universal gravitation. Bessel indeed saw the finality of his 
investigations as addressing the question “whether astronomical theories are everywhere in 
such great agreement with the observations so as to reject all doubts regarding the truth of 
Newton’s hypothesis.”34 Just like telescopes, mathematical analysis itself was in Bessel’s 
hands an instrument that could be perfected in order to probe the very foundations of the 
Newtonian theory.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Bessel (1824); repr. Bessel (1875–1876), 1: 86: “Ob aber die astronomischen Theorien 
allenthalben in so grosser Übereinstimmung mit den Beobachtungen sind, dass dadurch jeder 
Zweifel an der Wahrheit der Newton'schen Annahme zurückgewiesen wird, dieses ist eine 
Frage, welche wohl Niemand bejahen wird, deren genaue Erörterung jedoch sehr wichtig ist 
und die grössten Fortschritte der Wissenschaft verheisst.” For a study of Bessel’s 
cosmological understanding of Newton’s law, see Merleau- Ponty (1983), 119–122. 
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Conclusion 
As Bessel himself had intuited (Ławrynowicz 1995, 219), mathematics would soon literally 
become an instrument for the discovery of new celestial bodies. On September 23, 1846, the 
planet Neptune was discovered at the place computed by Urbain Le Verrier (1811–1877), 
who would soon declare that “[t]he great instrument with the help of which all these 
[astronomical] questions will be solved will be none other than the study and computations of 
perturbations.”35 Struck by this discovery, Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859) was curious 
to know what great development of the human thought, what new “organ” (like the telescope, 
algebra, or analysis) to use his own term, had made this discovery possible and asked his 
friend the mathematician Carl Jacobi (1804–1851) for his opinion.36 In a “thunderous letter,” 
Jacobi replied: “Good God!” This was not the result of any “deep thought, but [of] a nimble 
hand.” No deep mathematical thinking was involved in Le Verrier’s discovery. The only 
reason why mathematicians did not themselves take care of all astronomy was that this 
science relied on numerical results and that it was “boring to have to escort any thin idea with 
10,000 logarithms.”37  
This exchange underscores discrepant conceptions of mathematics as a tool and as an 
instrument. It nicely illustrates the slippage that could ensue from too close an association 
with material devices. While in the hands of Le Verrier and Bessel, mathematical analysis and 
computation had become powerful instruments for astronomical research, others like Jacobi 
relegated this to mere manual work of deskilled computers. By emphasizing the boredom of 
computational work in the observatory (Donnelly 2014), Jacobi was degrading astronomers’ 
status to that of menial workers, and the use of mathematics to the mere handling of a tool—a 
high-precision tool to be sure, but just a tool. “[I]f Leverrier has seen a new planet with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Excerpt from Le Verrier inaugural lecture at the Sorbonne; quoted in Revue scientifique et 
industrielle 28 (1847), 131.  
36 Humboldt to Jacobi (December 22, 1846); Humboldt and Jacobi (1987), 103. 
37 Jacobi to Humboldt (26 December 1846); Humboldt and Jacobi (1987), 104: “Du lieber 
Gott! Hier heißt es nicht, Gedanken tief, sondern Hand flink.” Humboldt and Jacobi (1987), 
105–106: “dieser Sachen kriegen erst durch die wirkliche numerische Ausfürung Werth, und 
es ist langweilich, jeder dünnen Gedanken sogleich mit 10,000 Logaritmen escortiren so 
müssen.” Humboldt himself called Jacobi’s a “donnerdend Brief.” Humboldt to Jacobi 
(December 26, 1846); ibid., 109. 
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eye of mathematics, Jacobi added, I have myself given a new eye to mathematics.”38 The 
mathematician found that toying with the instrument itself was more fun than using it. The 
design, care, and maintenance of such tools, he seemed to say, was of a higher purpose. Only 
this work ensured that mathematics remained applicable to astronomy and able to provide the 
required level of precision. A new conception of mathematics as Instrumentenkunde (Carl 
1863) was emerging, according to which mathematics could and should be developed 
autonomously from the needs of astronomical workers, or any other user of mathematics, for 
that matter. As Jacobi famously wrote about Fourier, a question about numbers was worth as 
much as a question about the system of the world and mathematics ought solely to be pursued 
“for the honor of human spirit.”39  
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Figure 1: On the top of the allegorical kiosk pictured on the frontispiece of Johnannes 
Kepler’s Rudolphine Tables (1627). Muses are holding some of the principal tools and 
instruments used by Kepler, from left to right: what looks like a representation of an 
eclipse; a telescope with line drawing used in optical theory inside; logarithms represented 
by Napier’s computing rods and the number 6931492, a close approximation of ln 2; 
geometry holding compass and set square in hand with a representation of an ellipse; an 
unequal-arm balance, and magnetism represented by loath stone and compass.  
